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1. CULTURE, IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM
In the last ten years the concepts of culture and identity have regained popularity
in political and legal analysis. Multiculturalism has become a prominent strand of
thought in political and legal philosophy. Defenders of multiculturalism emphas-
ize the plural character of contemporary societies, and argue that it is an issue of
justice to accommodate these cultural differences by providing cultural rights for
minority groups. Will Kymlicka in particular has done groundbreaking work in
his defence of cultural rights as being consistent with social–liberal political the-
ories such as those of Rawls and Dworkin.1 Kymlicka’s strategy has been to show
that most liberal democratic governments have adopted policies to accommodate
cultural differences and to recognize and promote minority cultures, for example
through group differentiated rights. In doing this he shifted the burden of proof by
pointing out the discontinuity between practices in liberal states and liberal polit-
ical philosophy. He thus argued that since cultural rights are consistent with liberal
political theory, they should be seen as an integral part of the liberal catalogue
of rights. However, critics like Brian Barry argue that cultural rights undermine
the legal protection of civil, political, and social rights that are normally offered
by liberal states to individual members of minority groups.2 Besides the recogni-
tionof cultural rights as citizenship rightswithin a (nation) state, cultural rights can
also be interpreted and recognized as an element of the catalogue of human rights.
2. CULTURAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
In her recent book, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Yvonne Donders elaborates
on cultural rights as a human rights provision, and focuses on the right to cultural
identity. Her research is guided by two questions: should a right to cultural identity
1. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989);Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights (1995).
2. B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (2001).
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be furtherdevelopedasa separate rightwithinthe frameworkof internationalhuman
rights law? if yes, what could be the nature, scope, and content of this right? (p. 9).
The international bill of human rights is codiﬁed in three instruments: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Five categories of human rights are distinguished:
civil, political, social, economic, and cultural. It is a generally accepted view in inter-
national human rights law that all these human rights are equally important,
and they are assumed to be an interdependent, indivisible, and interrelated part
of the international bill of human rights (p. 2; ch. 4). However, cultural rights
have received less attention than the other categories of human rights, espe-
cially civil and political rights. As a consequence, they are not well developed.
Although there are references to the right to cultural identity in various instru-
ments of international law, for example Article 27 UDHR and Article 15 ICCPR,
a separate right to cultural identity has not yet been adopted as a subjective
right. Donders gives three main categories of reasons for this immature status of
such cultural rights: conceptual, political, and pragmatic. One important reason
is the ontological vagueness of the term. Its conceptual building blocks, ‘cul-
ture’, ‘identity’, and ‘community’, are vague, and therefore are hard to translate
into legal provisions (ch. 2). Moreover, there are political reasons for the under-
developed status of cultural rights (p. 68). Governments have been very reluctant
to control the cultural life of their community (with the exception of totalitarian
regimes) and they also fear that strengthening cultural rightsmay lead to tensions in
society, endanger national unity, and even fuel demands for separation. Finally, the
emphasis on sub-elements of cultural identity in covenants (e.g. Article 15 ICESCR)
ignores the encompassing character of culture and undermines the right to cultural
identity as such as an operational concept in legal and political debates (ibid.).
The book is organized in two main parts. The ﬁrst part (chs. 2–4) is an ana-
lysis of the conceptual and normative debates surrounding cultural identity as a
human right. Donders draws upon information from anthropology and sociology
for her description of culture and cultural identity; she analyzes arguments from
political–theoretical defences (mainly based on Kymlicka’s work, as described in
section 1) for her description of cultural rights; and she presents an introduction of
the human rights framework as a way of discussing the right to cultural identity
within that framework. The second part of the book (chs. 5–11) analyzes several
established human rights provisions to determine how the right to cultural iden-
tity is protected within these provisions. It focuses on several declarations and con-
ventions (the UDHR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR), and on organizations (UNESCO,
the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe). Finally, it dis-
cusses the right to cultural identity in relation to indigenous peoples in general and
one example thereof: the Sami in northern Scandinavia. Not only are the provisions
themselvesdiscussed,butalso theirdraftingprocessesanddominant interpretations
by academic scholars. The book is not intended to be interdisciplinary: it is primar-
ily focused on international law, whereas the other disciplines serve as auxiliary
science.
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3. THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A HUMAN RIGHT
Under which conditions can the right to cultural identity be developed as a full-
grown separate category within the framework of international human rights
law? Donders argues that at least two conditions should bemet. The ﬁrst condition
is that this right must be essential for the protection of human dignity.
In this book, human dignity is considered a basic value, or . . . an ‘intrinsic worth’.
Respect for human dignity implies that individuals are not treated as instruments or
objects of the will of others. Instead, individual choices in matters of beliefs, way
of life, ideas and feelings should be respected. Human dignity is clearly violated
if certain treatment humiliates beliefs and choices of individuals. Respect for hu-
man dignity implies also respect for the communities that individuals are part of.
(p. 17)
She claims that within the international human rights debate, the value of cultural
membership for humandignity is ‘generally agreed on’ (p. 63). The second condition
is that the right to cultural identity must be justiciable. A right is justiciable if it can
be subjected ‘to the scrutiny of a court of law or another judicial or quasi-judicial
body’ (p. 18). This implies that such a right must be sufﬁciently clear and refer to
concrete obligations for government (pp. 18, 66–7).
A complicating factor is the presumed collective character of the right to cul-
tural identity. Defenders of collective rights argue that membership of a cultural
community is central for the human dignity of its members and that, consequently,
these communities should be protected by collective rights. They claim that the
introduction of collective human rights is necessary, because the individualistic
character of other human rights makes them unﬁt for the protection of cultural
communities. Critics, however, argue that this collective character of the right
to cultural identity might have unfortunate effects. It could be abused by re-
pressive regimes for supporting intolerable practices – intolerable in the sense
of justifying the violation of other human rights, especially civil and political
rights.3
Donders’s aim in this book is to investigate whether a separate right to cultural
identity (whether collective or individual) is desirable, necessary, or possible. She
conceptualizes culture as ‘a dynamic process, without ﬁxed centres or precise bound-
aries. It is a complex system of beliefs and practices, which can change and develop,
although there is a certain core’ (p. 29).Cultural identity is conceptualized as the per-
soniﬁcationofaculture, therelationbetweenthepersonandherculture (p.30). It can
involve various aspects of culture: arts, literature, religion, language, cultural herit-
age, andeducation, but alsohabits, traditions, customs, and institutions (pp. 30, 327).
If cultural identity is important for human dignity, we should seek to ﬁnd ways to
protect it within the political and legal framework. One question is whether such
cultural rights should be a collective right, assigned to the community as such, or a
group right, which is a group-differentiated individual right (p. 49).Moreover, a right
to cultural identity can be recognized in the form of soft law, containing guidelines
3. These arguments are similar to those made by Barry against multiculturalism (supra note 2).
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of conduct, not legally binding norms of law laid down in declarations and having
moral and political value, but with a limited legal value. Hard law is expressed in
legally binding instruments such as treaties (pp. 79–80).
In her analysis of the established human rights provisions she concludes that the
right to cultural identity is used only as soft law: it is seen as a general value, that
deserves to be respected and that underlies several speciﬁc rights for members of
minority cultures.
As a general conclusion, Donders argues that the right to cultural identity should
not be recognized as a separate right within the framework of international human
rights law. First she refutes the right to cultural identity as a collective right. Follow-
ing Galenkamp and other theorists, she argues that such collective rights may lead
to a process of making absolute collective identities and policies of conservation
of identity (p. 55). This may result in the locking up of individual members in
their community, leading to the suppression of internal opposition and the possible
violation of individual rights. She concludes:
I am not convinced that the protection of cultural communities and cultural identit-
ies should take place through collective rights . . .The deﬁnition of the community
and its cultural identity poses difﬁculties, but more important are the arguments of
locking up individuals in a collective cultural identity, the relation between the indi-
vidual and the community and the possible conﬂict between individual and collective
rights. An individual approach appearsmore appropriate, because cultural communit-
ies only exist through the consent of the members of the community. In my view,
communities should not be allowed to oppress individuals by invoking collective
rights. (p. 57)
Moreover, in the ﬁnal chapter, Donders concludes that the right to cultural
identity should not be developed at all, neither in the form of hard law nor as
soft law:
[T]ranslating cultural identity into a separate right is neither desirable nor neces-
sary. It is not desirable because translating the vague and general concept of cul-
tural identity into a right would risk abuse or suppression of individual rights and
freedoms within a cultural context. It is not necessary because existing cultural rights
in the broad sense already offer possibilities for the protection of cultural identity.
Hence, a separate right to cultural identity cannot satisfy the criteria for the prolif-
eration of human rights, namely, that new rights should only be developed if they
truly add something to the existing human rights, if there is sufﬁcient consensus
among States, and if they are sufﬁciently clear to bring about rights and obligations.
(p. 337)
The refutation proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst step it is concluded that the
comprehensive nature of cultural identity cannot be reduced to a concrete and
justiciable right. ‘A right, especially if it were to have a justiciable character, should
be sufﬁciently clear to be used before a judicial body, and the State obligations to
the right should be concrete’ (p. 337). In itself this is not enough for the refutation
of the right to cultural identity, since other human rights also sometimes relate to
vague and dynamic concepts. Therefore she adds a second step, concluding that: ‘It
is the risk of the abuse of this vague and broad right, for example the suppression
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of individual rights and freedoms, that is decisive’ (p. 338). It can be misused to
excuse questionable cultural practices within cultural communities. The third step
argues that existing human rights provisions ‘already offer possibilities in relation
to the protection of (aspects of) cultural identity’: non-discrimination, the freedom
of religion, expression, and association, and the right to education (p. 339). These
human rights provisions protect indirectly the right to cultural identity as a general
value.
4. AN EVALUATION OF TOWARDS A RIGHT TO CULTURAL
IDENTITY?
This book has several strengths: it is well written and well organized, and the
author shows great scholarship in the ﬁeld of international human rights. The book
gives a comprehensive overview of many aspects of the right to cultural identity
in international law and its defence in conventions, declarations, and covenants.
It not only gives an extensive overview of human rights arrangements in which
the right to cultural identity has been discussed; the author also elaborates on
conceptual and normative issues surrounding this subject. I have one major point
of criticism. For an investigation into the desirability of the introduction of a right
to cultural identity, the book focuses too much on the legal debate on human
rights while the reason why human rights are so important, namely the protection
of human dignity, remains underexposed. I think that some issues in the con-
temporaryhuman rights debatemight beneﬁt froma shift in emphasis fromhuman
rights to human dignity. I will elaborate this point by playing the devil’s advocate
and raising some questions about the conclusion concerning the indefensibility of
therighttocultural identity.Sincethebookiswritteninthetraditionofhumanrights
research,mydiscussion is only partly a critique, andmore an attempt to broaden the
debate. Iwill focus on two issues: the distinctionbetweennormative anddescriptive
analysis (section 5), and the right to cultural identity as a separate category of human
rights (section 6).
5. NORMATIVE VS. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Thestrengthof thebookis its combinationofconceptual,normative, anddescriptive
analysis. Unfortunately this comprehensive character is also a weakness, because
the author seems to conﬂate two forms of analysis that should be kept separate:
descriptive and normative.4 A descriptive analysis is offered by an external observer
of the debate. One describes the situation of the right to cultural identity in political
and legal debates, its development over time, andmaybe even presents a forecast of
possible future developments. One describes its implementations in conventions,
declarations, and so on, and explains why governments are reluctant to recognize
4. This division is endorsed by the author when she distinguishes the study of law as it is (de lege lata) and the
desirable development of the law (de lege feranda) (p. 19).
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speciﬁc human rights. A normative analysis implies participation in the debate. If
one is of the opinion, as the author is, that the right to cultural identity is an import-
ant element of respect for human dignity, one should seek to clarify the conceptual
and normative issues. One should seek ways to overcome the problems that block
the translation of the issue into rights. One starts from the value of human dignity,
and aims to make as strong a case as possible for the inclusion of a right to cultural
identity in the internationalbill ofhumanrights.This iswhatRawls calls the realist–
utopian position: presenting a normative defence that ‘extends what are ordinarily
thought of as the limits of practical political possibility’.5 This implies a critical
distance from actual political debates. One’s ﬁrst worry should not be the political
feasibility of the proposal; instead, one hopes to inﬂuence the political debate by
giving additional arguments for one’s position. One can do both, as the author does,
but both analyses should bekept separate. In this book the two lines of argument are
conﬂated. The author starts with the normative project, defending the importance
of the right to cultural identity as an interpretation of human dignity. However, as
the argument proceeds, this normative aim becomes watered down as political and
pragmatic arguments are also taken into consideration (see for example pp. 338–9).
Her strength in her conceptual and normative analysis is that it is not only based on
academic debates in anthropology, sociology, and political theory, but also includes
information from actual debates such as the discussions of the Fribourg Group
(pp. 76–9) and the chapters on the right to cultural identity in several human rights
provisions (chs. 4–11). However, she not only includes conceptual and normative
building blocks for her argument, she also starts worrying about the political feas-
ibility of the proposal (p. 78).
She takes the opinions of national states as a fait accompli, and does not critically
scrutinize these opinions. The fact that some countries would not accept speciﬁc
human rights need not undermine a normative defence of such human rights.
The fact that China and other Asian tigers dispute (elements of) the Universal
DeclarationofHumanRights doesnot in itself undermine thevalueofhuman rights
as a critical instrument for evaluating these and other regimes. On the contrary, a
focus on human rights pre-eminently enables us to take a critical distance from
actual policies of actual governments, and criticize them from the point of view of
lack of respect for human dignity. As Donders herself asserts: ‘Human dignity is the
source of human rights. Human rights are derived from the basic value of human
dignity, not from the State or any other authority. This implies that human rights
are for everyone and that these rights cannot be taken away’ (p. 17).
Asimilarargumentcanbemadefortherighttocultural identity. Insomecases, the
fact that somegovernmentsdoopposesucharight shouldbeanadditional reasonfor
an impassioned normative defence for the inclusion of the right to cultural identity
in the human rights provisions. One should not focus primarily on the question
whether the right to cultural identity is accepted by governments; instead, one
should seek to give a strong normative defence, based on the idea of human dignity,
5. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), 6.
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of the inclusion of the right to cultural identity as an element of the human rights
catalogue.
6. THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A SEPARATE CATEGORY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
While reading the book, I was somewhat confused about the status of the right to
cultural identity. Although her research question aims to investigate the right to
cultural identity as ‘a separate right within the framework of international human
rights’ (p. 9), throughout the book Donders interprets this right as an element of
cultural rights. More generally, I ﬁnd the conceptual framework of the relationship
between human rights unclear, not only in her own analysis, but also in the human
rights discourse in general (as described by the author). On the one hand, cultural
rights are seen – together with civil, political, economic, and social rights – as an
interdependent, indivisible, and interrelated part of the international bill of human
rights, as codiﬁed in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR (p. 2). On the other
hand Donders seeks to describe cultural rights as a separate category. As someone
unfamiliar with the ﬁeld of international human rights, I was surprised by this
apparent contradiction: either the set of human rights is interdependent, indivisible,
and interrelated, or the several human rights can be described in separate categories.
This is not only academic hair-splitting: one of the reasons why Donders denies the
right to cultural identity is because it cannot be conceptualized as a separate cat-
egory. Moreover, viewing the complex of human rights as ‘interdependent, indivis-
ible, and interrelated’ implicitly assumes that human rights cannot be conﬂicting.
And if they do conﬂict, this formulation does not provide a tool to balance them. At
the same time, however, it is perfectly clear thatDonders presupposes a hierarchy of
human rights, because recognizing (collective) cultural rights should never lead
to the suppression of existing (individual) human rights (see pp. 15, 57, 334–5,
337).
As I understand from the book, the description of the relation between the dif-
ferent categories of human rights is problematical. Donders criticizes Karl Vasak’s
metaphor of generations of human rights because it incorrectly suggests that one
generation supersedes and replaces the other (p. 94). Instead, the several categories
ofhumanrights aremeant to supplementandmutually strengtheneachother.How-
ever, this character isnotdisplayed in thecategorical contradistinctions inwhichthe
debate is phrased: the emphasis on differential human rights as separate categories,
the strict division between individual and collective rights, and so on. For example,
Donders concludes that ‘From a legal point of view, a right to cultural identity falls
naturally within the category of cultural human rights’ (p. 331; my italics). At the
same time, as she asserts, it is clear that the right to cultural identity is also protected
by other human rights (e.g. civil rights such as the freedom of religion, expression,
and association) (cf. p. 74). Another example is a quote in the book, claiming that
cultural rights ‘jeopardize’ the division of human rights into freedom rights and
rights demanding state action (p. 71). A large part of chapter 4 (especially pp. 69–76)
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is devoted to this problem of the interrelations between the supposedly separate
categories of human rights.
A possible solution for this conceptual problem is to shift the emphasis from
the human rights themselves to the underlying conceptions of human dignity. Ulti-
mately the central aim of human rights is to protect human dignity. Human dignity
can be discussed at several levels of abstraction and has many different aspects. At
a high level of abstraction we refer to the concept of human dignity itself; at a lower
level of abstraction, we refer to different conceptions thereof as particular interpret-
ations of the concept in a speciﬁc context.6 There are many conceptions of human
dignity, and the most important of them have been translated into human rights.
These different conceptions of human dignity and their inferred human rights are
additive and partly overlapping, and each of them is a reaction to different social
and political realities. Civil rights emerged as the protection of citizens against the
backgroundof absolutemonarchs, claiming that humandignity presupposes amin-
imumof individual freedomandself-determination.Economicrightsemergedalong
with the rise of socialism, claiming that human dignity and self-determination pre-
suppose speciﬁc social and economic conditions to be fulﬁlled. The corresponding
catalogue of human rights can therefore not be an essentialist enumeration of sep-
arate categories; instead, it is a more or less organic collection of rights, deemed
important for the protection of different conceptions of human dignity. Given
that human rights have been formulated against the background of differential
social and political realities, these rights are not reciprocally exclusive, but, instead,
cumulative, partly overlapping, and potentially conﬂicting (cf. p. 73).
This potential conﬂict between several conceptions of one concept is not uncom-
mon. The concept of human dignity is formulated at such a high level of abstraction
that possible disagreements about its interpretation and implementation are con-
cealed. Only when it is made more concrete, that is, translated into conceptions
and the accompanying human rights, do these disagreements come to the fore. As
Dworkin explains: ‘At the ﬁrst level agreement collects around discrete ideas that
are uncontroversially employed in all interpretations; at the second the controversy
latent in this abstraction is identiﬁed and taken up.’7
Instead of using the generations metaphor, we could describe the catalogue of
internationalhumanrights intermsofapilemetaphor.8 Theﬁrst layerconsistsof the
most fundamental human rights, namely civic and political rights, protecting the
accompanying conceptions of human dignity. The second layer, consisting of social
and economic rights, presupposes and leans on the ﬁrst layer, but adds elements
that are insufﬁciently covered by theﬁrst layer. Since the later layers presuppose the
earlier ones, they can only be defended as long as the rights defended here do not
6. I followhereDworkin’sdistinctionbetween ‘concept’ and ‘conception’. SeeR.Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously
(1977), 134–6; idem, Law’s Empire (1986), 71; J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), 14, n. 15.
7. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 6, at 71.
8. This metaphor is inspired by the work of Mark Bovens andWillemWitteveen on the ‘ediﬁce of the consti-
tutional state’. See, e.g., M. Bovens and E. Loos, ‘The Digital Constitutional State: Democracy and Law in the
Information Society’, (2003) 4 Information Polity: The International Journal of Government and Democracy in the
Information Age 7.
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obstruct the conceptions of humandignity as defendedby theunderlying layer. And
since the ﬁrst two layers still do not cover all aspects of human dignity, we have to
add a third layer, consisting of cultural rights, possibly including a right to cultural
identity.
This metaphor has at least three advantages. For one thing, it is different from
Vasak’s generations metaphor, in the sense that later rights do not replace their
predecessors. Instead, they presuppose them; they are necessary as their foundation.
Moreover, with this metaphor the fact that some aspects of cultural identity are
already covered by civic rights, such as the freedom of religion, is not a problem
(cf. 72–4). Finally, additional human rights can only be defended in this model
for as long as they are not inconsistent with earlier rights, because they would
then undermine the accompanying conception of human dignity. For example,
cultural rights can only be defended if they are necessary to protect the accom-
panying conception of human dignity (e.g. cultural identity), and do not interfere
with the conceptions of human dignity protected by civil and political rights. This
implies an automatic protection of more basic human rights against later ones, and
makes the implicit hierarchy as found in Donders’s argument explicit.
Thismetaphor enables us to defend the right to cultural identity in a conditional
way, depending upon the situation under which this right is claimed by a cultural
community. As such it can protect speciﬁc cultural practices when they provide
members of cultural communities with a sense of belonging or personal integrity,
since these are seen as one conception of human dignity. And this is precisely what
Donders aims to do:
In short, a right to cultural identity should be universally applicable to all communit-
ies and individuals, regardless of their language, traditions, geographical place, etc.,
because cultural identity is an important element of human dignity. The speciﬁc im-
plementation of this right may, in principle, vary, depending upon the situation and
the cultural identity involved. However . . . the implementation of a right to cultural
identity cannot takeplaceunconditionally. Toprevent the implementationof a right to
cultural identity emptying existing human rights of theirmeaning, itmust not restrict
existing human rights. (p. 15)
7. CONCLUSION
Donders’s conclusion that ‘translating cultural identity into a separate right is
neither desirable nor necessary’ (p. 337) cannot be drawn from the evidence she
provides in the book. Her ﬁrst argument, the ontological vagueness of cultural iden-
tity, is weaker than her presentation would have us believe. I agree that it is very
hard to conceptualize cultural identity in sociology and anthropology, because in
these ﬁelds one seeks to understand cultural identity as such (cf. ch. 2). However, in
political–theoretical and legal debates the conceptualization of cultural identity is
a less holistic task. The question of the protection of cultural identity only comes up
when it is in danger. For one thing, cultural identity comes to the surface when it is
directly confrontedwith other cultural identities (p. 35).Moreover, the awareness of
one’s cultural identity is strengthened when this identity is in jeopardy (p. 328). So,
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although it is true that cultural identity in general is hard to conceptualize, at the
moments relevant for this debate –when endangered – it seems to bemore tangible
than in other situations.
Thesecondargument is that theright tocultural identity ‘mightbeabused toexcuse
questionable cultural practiceswithin cultural communities’ (p. 338,my emphasis).
However, inothercases the right tocultural identitymightbeused to supportvaluable
cultural practices against unjustiﬁed prohibitions by illiberal governments.9 The
implicit assumption throughout the book is that cultural communities can be (and
are actually) oppressive and states can’t, for example: ‘In my view, communities
should not be allowed to oppress individuals by invoking collective rights’ (p. 57).
But isn’t this a peculiar assumption, especially in a defence of human rights?
Of course, not all cultural practices can be supported, for example female cir-
cumcision, because it conﬂicts with another conception of human dignity: namely
personal integrity (as protected by civil rights). But the fact that some (or maybe
even many) practices cannot be defended for this reason does not undermine
the right to cultural identity as such as an interpretation of a speciﬁc concep-
tion of human dignity. Indeed, the questions are (i) to what extent a cultural
practice is essential for human dignity; and (ii) to what extent this practice is in
conﬂict with another conception of human dignity. These questions cannot be
answered in general, but have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by a court
of law, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Such a decision should
be made by balancing (the importance of) the relevant conceptions of human
dignity.
The third argument claims that existing human rights provisions already offer
possibilities in relation to the protection of (aspects of) cultural identity (p. 339).
But Donders does not reassure us that all relevant cultural practices are protected
by these other human rights. The right to cultural identity might still be relevant
for cultural practices that:
(1) contribute substantively to theirmembers’ identity and senseof integrity, that
is, they are essential for their human dignity;
(2) do not violate other conceptions of human dignity (e.g. personal integrity);
and
(3) are not covered byother human rights that protect aspects of cultural identity.
I am not sure whether such practices exist. However, the argument in this book
cannot ensure that they no not exist. To identify them we have to focus on the
relation between cultural identity and conceptions of human dignity, and discuss
whether all relevant conceptions of human dignity are covered by existing human
rights.
However, these issues can only be identiﬁed in a normative analysis that fo-
cuses on the importance of (differential conceptions of) human dignity, the relation
9. For adiscussion inmulticulturalismon the limited roleof governments thathaveoppressedminority groups
see: J. Spinner-Halev, ‘Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State’, (2001) 112 Ethics 94–8.
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betweenhumandignityandhumanrights,andthepossibleconﬂictsbetweenseveral
conceptions of human dignity and their related human rights. That is, these debates
on international human rights law could beneﬁt from a more thorough analysis of
normative political philosophy, especially contemporary multiculturalism.10
Roland Pierik∗
TanakaAkihiko,TheNewMiddleAges: TheWorldSystem in the 21stCentury, translated
by Jean Connell Hoff, Tokyo, International House of Japan, 2002, 264 pp. (ﬁrst
published asAtarashii ‘chu¯sei’ 21seiki no sekai shisutemu (1996)).
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156503221385
1. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT THE NEW MIDDLE AGES?
For more than ﬁfteen years now there has been a diffuse feeling that the world is in
a state of metamorphosis, but it is not quite clear what end-state, if any, this entails.
There is a certainhypnotic effect of such fashionable catchwords as postmodernism,
globalization, and global governance. Most of these catchwords are ahistorical in
that they create the image of a world radically different from anything we know
from the past.
To ward off this hypnotic effect, one may check the heuristic value of historical
analogies such as hegemony and –why not? – empire. From the historical armoury,
new medievalism is still another conceptual tool to grasp the present historical
transformation. Expressed in the briefest formula, newmedievalism is the idea that
the emergentworld systemhas important structural similaritieswith the European
Middle Ages.
Historical analogies are always problematic in that they may blind us to what
is novel in the present historical conjuncture. But to the extent that the diagnosis
of a new medievalism is empirically warranted, it has the decisive advantage that
at least to a certain extent it avoids the ahistorical blindness of other diagnostic
instruments.
Of course one may object that new medievalism has a Eurocentric cultural bias.
When talking about the newMiddle Ages,1 it is almost always the EuropeanMiddle
Ages to which one is referring. On the other hand, it is all themore astonishing that
from time to time there are non-European voices talking about new medievalism.
10. For some recent normative work in normative political philosophy that could be relevant, see M. Ignatieff,
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (2001); A. Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and
Women’s Rights (2001);W.Kymlicka andM.Opalski,Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory
and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (2001); W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction
(2002), 327–76; T. Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibilities’, in C. Cronin and P. De Greiff (eds.),
Transnational Politics and Deliberative Democracy (2002).
∗ Assistant lecturer in political theory in the Law Department of Tilburg University. Review essay, defended
as Ph.D. thesis atMaastricht University. I thank Rianne Letschert, Ingrid Robeyns andWillem vanGenugten
for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1. H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order inWorld Politics (1977), 254–5, 264–76.
650 BOOK REVIEWS
Thusin1996ProfessorTanakaAkihikofromTokyopublishedawholebook,Atarashii
chu¯sei (The NewMiddle Ages), which has now been translated into English.
Themain point of Tanaka’s book is summarized by the author himself as follows
(p. 222):
The world system we live in today has changed so much that it can no longer be
described as ‘modern’; though it perhaps may not be acceptable to say so from a
deterministic view of historical progress, I maintain it is evolving into something that
resembles the European Middle Ages . . . the modern world system is itself coming to
an end, and we are in a transition to a ‘NewMedievalism’.
2. THE THREE TRADITIONS
To understand Tanaka’s position properly, it is helpful to distinguish between three
different branches of political speculation about new medievalism. Most authors
stress medieval fragmentation and therefore understand new medievalism as the
return of a chaotic ‘world without a centre’. Although there are some exceptions
to this rule, this tradition mostly uses the Middle Ages as a dystopia. The most
prominent representatives of this tradition include Umberto Eco, Robert Gilpin,
Pierre Hassner, Daniel Held, Robert Kaplan, AlainMinc, and ArnoldWolfers.
What is lurking behind here is the Renaissance scheme of historiography which
constructs the Middle Ages as the ‘dark ages’ that are ﬁnally overcome but may
eventually return if mankind defects from its path towards modernization. In this
optic, the Middle Ages represent the spectre of the past that should have been
exorcized for ever.
There is another branch of speculation about new medievalism, which has a
closer afﬁnity to the philosophy of history. Take as an example the anti-bolshevist
Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev. Upset by the Russian Revolution, Berdyaev
speculated in the early 1920s about the dawn of a revived, neo-medieval spirituality
to rescue theworld from the curse ofmodernity (1924).2 Interestingly, Berdyaevwas
later followed by the Catholic Japanese theologian Yoshimitsu Yoshihiko, who, in
a 1933 symposium of right-wing Japanese intellectuals, declared that new mediev-
alism would make it possible to ‘overcome modernity’.3 Other ﬁgures who could
be mentioned in this context are the French Catholic theologian Jacques Maritain
and the French poet and philosopher Charles Pe´gui. The concern with medieval
spirituality certainly has a lot to do with the aesthetic and spiritual movement in
the wake of nineteenth-century romanticism.
In short, the ﬁrst tradition is concernedwith theMiddle Ages as a ‘worldwithout
a centre’, that is, with the societal fragmentation of the EuropeanMiddle Ages. The
second tradition, by contrast, tends to focus on the ideological uniformity of the
2. N. A. Berdyaev, Novoe Srednevekov’e (1924) (published in German as Das neue Mittelalter: Betrachtungen u¨ber
das Schicksal Rußlands und Europas (1927) and in English as The End of Our Time (1933)).
3. See the article by M. Ryo¯en, ‘The Symposium on “Overcoming Modernity”’, www.nanzan-u.ac.jp/
SHUBUNKEN/publications/nlarc/pdf/Rude%20awakenings/Minamoto.pdf. Another case from Japan is the
Buddhist movement Soka Gakkai International (www.eaglepeak.clara.co.uk/1997.html).
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MiddleAges, in the formof universalismand spiritual unity. Each tradition captures
an important aspect of the medieval world. This sounds pretty much like a false
dichotomy.
Against this false dichotomy one can object that it is precisely the distinctive
feature of medievalism that both are possible at the same time: fragmentation on
the one hand and uniformity on the other. Thus, in the EuropeanMiddle Ages there
were an emperor and a pope to hold feudal society together.4 In the new Middle
Ages, an increasingly centrifugal society is held together by the disciplining force of
the market on the one hand and politics on the other.5
This dialectical viewpoint can be invented as the third tradition about newmed-
ievalism. Tanaka can be located somewhere between the second and the third tra-
dition. On the one hand he associates the European Middle Ages with ideological
uniformity rather than societal fragmentation. On the other he does recognize that
in theMiddle Ages there was amultiplicity of actors both in the political and in the
societal realm.
3. THE MAIN ARGUMENT
In the followingparagraphs I outline themain argument of Tanaka’s book.Whereas
the book is arranged inductively, for practical reasons I will turn it on its head, that
is, start from the end and workmyself to the beginning.6
Chapters 7 and 8 contain the central argument of the book. In chapter 8 Tanaka
divides theworld into three spheres: ﬁrst, a chaotic sphere of poor and undemocratic
failed states; second, a modern sphere of states that suffer an imbalance between
political and economic conditions: either they are economically advanced but polit-
ically authoritarian, or they are politically democratic butwithout a solid economic
basis to sustain a stable democratic constitution; third, a neo-medieval sphere of post-
modern states which are both democratic and economically advanced. Whereas
the chaotic sphere is in need of international patronage, the modern sphere is still
characterized by the familiar pattern of power politics. The neo-medieval sphere, by
contrast, has already moved beyond the Westphalian system, although it is forced
to apply the logic of anarchy in its relationship with the states of the modern
sphere.
In chapter 7 Tanaka unfolds his understanding of newmedievalism. In his view,
the European Middle Ages were distinguished by a multiplicity of actors, all of
which enjoyed considerable autonomy: the emperor, kings, counts, earls, knights,
the pope, bishops, monasteries, military religious orders, autonomous city-states
and leagues, universities, and so on. Feudal clienteles and personal relationships
4. See O. von Gierke,Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 3,Die Staats- und Korporationslehre des Alterthums und
des Mittelalters und ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland (1954 [1881]); Political Theories of the Middle Ages (1987).
5. J. Friedrichs, ‘The Neomedieval Renaissance’, in I. Dekker and W. Werner (eds.), Governance and Inter-
national Legal Theory (2003, forthcoming); ‘The Meaning of New Medievalism’, (2001) 7 European Journal of
International Relations 475.
6. I deliberately leave aside the last two chapters where Tanaka applies new medievalism to the political
constellation in the Asian Paciﬁc in general, and to Japanese foreign policy in particular.
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among theseactorswereparamount, and the relationbetween territoryandpolitical
authority was ﬂuid rather than ﬁxed. Accordingly, there was no clear distinction
between domestic and international affairs. But ‘if relations among medieval poli-
tical actors were the ultimate in pluralism, ideologically speaking the European
Middle Ages were characterized by extreme uniformity’ (p. 137); by this Tanaka
means the Christian theology embodied by the Roman Catholic Church. In short,
ideological homogeneitymore thanneutralized the diversity of actors and provided
for a basically uniform political environment.
In analogy to the European Middle Ages, Tanaka recalls that today there is
again a proliferation of non-state actors, such as transnational corporations and
non-governmental organizations. However, Tanaka claims that in the neo-medieval
sphere ideological conﬂict has come to an end. The Western model of democratic
accountability vis-a`-vis the citizens has triumphed. To deal with breaches of the
democratic peace, there is a revival of the ‘just war’ doctrine that was strong in the
Middle Ages. Moreover, economic interdependence among the economically most
advanced statesmakeswar increasinglyunlikely, at least in theneo-medieval sphere
(of course Tanaka admits that economic interdependence is a result of modernity
and was not that strong in theMiddle Ages).
To lay the conceptual foundations for his vision of the newMiddle Ages, Tanaka
dedicates two chapters (1 and 2) to the end of the ColdWar and the emergence of a
post-Cold War world; two chapters (3 and 4) to the establishment of US hegemony
after the Second World War and its presumed decline in the 1970s and 1980s; and
two chapters (5 and 6) to the concomitant increase in interdependence between
the advanced capitalist states and its institutionalization in various international
organizations and regimes.
4. CRITICAL COMMENTS
Theﬁrst six chapters provide an interesting tour d’horizonof themainstreamof inter-
national relations theory. To the student of international relations it is interesting to
see which approaches are appealing to a Japanese author and how he understands
them. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that these chapters are hardly innovat-
ive.Moreover it is important to stress that the original Japanese version of the book
appeared in 1996, that is, before the east Asian ﬁnancial crises of 1997, the terror-
ist attacks on the Twin Towers in September 2001, and the apparent Anglo-Saxon
return in 2003 to the project of military and ideological hegemony.7
The last phenomenon in particular makes it highly debatable whether Tanaka’s
end-of-history scenario is not overly optimistic. On the other hand, it is far too early
to determine whether the world is really going to experience still another version
of new medievalism, that is, the clash of crusading civilizations. Some people may
expect the victorious ‘coalition’ against Iraq to succeed, whereas others will wish
them to ﬁnd a decently peaceful way out of theMiddle Eastern trap.
7. The book was translated into English without any factual update.
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On the other hand, the present travails should not blind us to the important
question of where the world is moving in the medium or even the long term.
Thus, one prominent international relations scholar is currently speculating as to
‘why a world state is inevitable’.8 Against this, new medievalism may provide a
strong case that it is possible to have a post-Westphalian world without a global
super-state. Indeed it seems possible that politics and the market may hold a
fragmented society together, just as the emperor and the pope did with feudal
society.
5. NEW MEDIEVALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Being a political scientist, Tanaka is not very concerned with the legal implications
of his neo-medieval scenario. Nevertheless, it is certainly interesting to speculate
what the advent of newmedievalismmight mean to international law.
In the ﬁrst place, international lawyers and international legal theorists (or inter-
national legal philosophers) might feel entitled to pursue ‘law’s empire’, that is, to
hold an increasingly fragmented society together by the formulation and enforce-
ment of legal norms.9 Alternatively, international lawyers could strive for a status
comparable to that of scholasticism in theMiddle Ages, when the disputatiowas the
paradigmaticmethod of intellectual conﬂict resolution.10 Finally, international law
couldmirror thecleavagesof theneo-medievalworldby increasing its specialization
into a plurality of sub-ﬁelds.11 At least there should be a clear differentiation into in-
ternational state law, internationalmarket law, and international society law,which
would mirror the functional autonomy of politics, economics, and civil society in
the neo-medieval world.12
Of course it is not possible, in a book review, to spell this out in further detail.
However, it has certainly become clear how far the diagnosis of long-term his-
torical transformation is relevant for the direction international law should take.
Jo¨rg Friedrichs∗
Fre´de´ric Me´gret, Le Tribunal Pe´nal International pour le Rwanda, Perspectives Inter-
nationales 23, Paris, Pedone, 2002, ISBN 2233004108, 249 pp.,€24.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156503231381
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is the second ad hoc
tribunal, established by the Security Council in 1994, after the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had been created in 1993. The
8. A. Wendt, Why a World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy (2003), unpublished
(http://www.src.uchicago.edu/politicaltheory/Wendt03.pdf).
9. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986).
10. J. W. Baldwin, The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 1000–1300 (1971).
11. W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964).
12. Friedrichs, ‘Neomedieval Renaissance’, supra note 5.
∗ Research associate at the International University Bremen, on a project on the internationalization of the
state monopoly of violence.
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mere fact that the Security Council interfered in the internal conﬂict of Rwanda
conﬁrmed the view that the commission of genocide and other gross human rights
violations are threats to international peace and security, and thus ought to come
within the purviewof theCouncil’s powers underChapterVII of theUNCharter. As
the ‘younger one’, and possibly also as a result of its geographical location, the ICTR
has so far remained in the shadow of its older brother. In comparisonwith the ICTY,
ICTR trials have attracted far less scholarly attention or universal media coverage.
Me´gret’s book may be regarded as a welcome response to this ‘negligence’ and to
the more general complaint that the ICTR does not receive the attention that it
should, considering its contributions to the development of international criminal
law. In his introduction,Me´gret refers to the ‘primeurs’ of the ICTR to illustrate such
contributions. They include the ﬁrst genocide conviction, the ﬁrst female accused
of genocide, and the ﬁrst prime minister to be convicted of an international crime
(p. 16).
True, these ‘primeurs’ have not been entirely disregarded by academics, and
some in-depth articles relating to the ICTR have been written. Nevertheless, to date
there are not many legal volumes dealing solely with the ICTR in a comprehensive
fashion. Hence, Me´gret’s book clearly ﬁlls a gap in existing literature on the ad hoc
tribunals.
The book primarily aims to give an insight into the Tribunal and its function-
ing. However, the author also relates his ideas to more general observations con-
cerning the immaturity of the present international legal order, the framework in
which the ICTR operates. In this vein, Me´gret starts his book with the reﬂection
that the Rwandan genocide was, on a more theoretical level, the result of a con-
ception of law that stresses norms, while refusing to accord effective sanctions
to ensure their application (p. 13). He concludes his book with the remark that
the ad hoc character of the ICTR risks undermining its capacity to render justice,
followed by the expression of a hope that this will be the last ad hoc tribunal
in history (p. 240). Me´gret thus stresses the need for the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) as an essential feature of a genuine fully ﬂedged international
community.
Me´gret’s book is in three parts, covering three dimensions of the Tribunal : the in-
stitutional, the procedural, and the substantive. Part I describes the establishment of
the ICTR as an international institution, and it outlines the organizational structure
of the Tribunal as well as the relation of the Tribunal with states. Part II surveys the
procedurebefore the ICTRanddiscusses thedifferent stagesofacase.Thispart inpar-
ticular deals with issues that have been largely left untouched in academic writing
so far. Part III considers substantive law, and includes an analysis of ICTR case lawon
the three international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, as well as a discussion of some problems of general international criminal
law, such as the attribution of individual responsibility, defences, the standard and
credibility of proof, and penalties.
The book is well structured. It presupposes some knowledge of international
criminal law and recent developments in that area, hence it cannot serve as an
introduction to the ICTR for a layman in the ﬁeld of international (criminal)
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law. Instead, the readers’ public is conﬁned to a more select group of academics
and international jurists. For this group, the book offers some quite interesting
viewpoints.
For instance, Me´gret analyzes the sources of law that assist the judges in the
interpretation of the ICTR Statute. He observes that general principles of law aswell
as doctrine and judicial decisions play an important role in this respect, in contrast
to their supplementary place in the enumeration of sources of international law in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Here again, Me´gret
underlines that this use of sources denotes the immaturity and anarchy of the
international community and the failure to build a coherent legal order proactively,
which has culminated in some creative jurisprudence. He further calls attention
to the relevance of soft law, to documents of the International Law Commission
and International Committee of the Red Cross Commentaries, and to the role of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the development of the ICTR’s case law
(pp. 168–72).
Another notable observation byMe´gret concerns the question as to whether war
crimes require a direct link to an armed conﬂict. The requirement of such a link
resulted in systematic acquittal on the count of war crimes in the early case law
of the Tribunal. While various scholars criticized this approach, Me´gret notes – in
a footnote (note 688, at p. 194) – that if the ‘ﬁght’ against all Tutsi within Rwanda
were indeed considered part of the armed conﬂict, thiswould in fact risk conﬁrming
prevailing government propaganda at the time of the genocide that all Tutsi were
allies of the invading Rwandese Patriotic Front, propaganda that was used to justify
attacks against Tutsi throughout Rwanda. Consequently, Me´gret questions the case
law of the Appeals Chamber in the Akayesu case that has opened the door to a
more liberal interpretation of the link to an armed conﬂict (pp. 194–5). He submits
that it may not be correct to label crimes that happen to have been committed
simultaneously with an armed conﬂict, but not speciﬁcally in the context of that
armed conﬂict, as war crimes.
Throughout the bookMe´gret refers to many decisions that the Rwanda Tribunal
hastakeninordertoexplaintheprocedureandtoillustrateorsupporthisarguments.
He thus acquaints the readerwith the Tribunal’s judgements and other case law, and
complementshis legalanalysiswith interesting inside informationontheTribunal’s
functioning. In sum, the book presents a concise picture of all aspects of the Rwanda
Tribunal, and is well written. Since the Tribunal is in full operation, with some of
its most important judgements still to come, it would be useful if the book were to
be updated in about ﬁve years’ time.
Some suggestions may be offered for such an updated version. A ﬁrst suggestion
relates to Me´gret’s analysis of the proof of speciﬁc intent for a charge of genocide.
Although he describes accurately the case law that acknowledged the difﬁculty
of proving such intent and that deduced the intent from circumstantial evidence
ﬂowing from a consistent pattern of conduct (pp. 179–82), some reference to the
Bagilishema judgement might be well placed. In this judgement, leading to the
acquittal of the bourgmestre Bagilishema, the trial chamber warned against too
much reliance on contextual evidence to construe such intent. The intent had to be
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established above all by relying on the accused’s own behaviour.1 This judgement
may serve to adjust slightly the line of previous case law set out byMe´gret regarding
proof of speciﬁc intent.
The second suggestion concerns the complex issue of responsibility for the cir-
cumstances of arrest. In cases of a state arresting an individual at the request of
the Rwanda Tribunal, the Tribunal does not assume any responsibility whatsoever
for any illegality of the arrest in respect of international standards, if the arrest has
been executed in accordance with the national law of the requested state. This is
properly explainedbyMe´gretwithexact reference to someof thecase lawconcerned
(pp. 105–6). However, onemight expect amore elaborate discussion on this challen-
ging issue delineating the border line between international and national jurisdic-
tions. How does this question relate for instance to the Tribunal’s own submission
that it is fully bound by international human rights standards? Of course, it may
be excessive to assign the Tribunal full responsibility for matters that lie outside its
sphere of competence stricto sensu, but the Tribunal could develop ideas regarding
remedies in such cases once the cases come under its control.
Equally, the thorny issue of provisional release could in a next edition be con-
sidered in somewhat more depth, given the disparity between the two ad hoc
tribunals on this matter. Me´gret rightly indicates that provisional release is a sen-
sitive issue, and that no such release has yet been ordered in order to avoid offending
the Rwandan government (p. 80). It may be added that provisional release is also
complicated by the fact that a released accused cannot return home, in contrast
to those released by the ICTY, due to the different landscapes in which the two ad
hoc tribunals operate. A further discussion on which criteria would be useful to
regulate provisional release, and how to apply these, would most certainly be very
interesting.
Still, in its current form, the book gives a concise and informative insight into the
functioning of the ICTR, and as such it is very welcome.
LarissavandenHerik∗
Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-determination in International Law, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0521781787, 456 pp., £55.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156503241388
1. INTRODUCTION
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law by Karen Knop presents a series
ofcareful,yetprovocative, readingsof international legaltextsonself-determination.
This review essay seeks to ‘register what is different and new in [the] impression[s]’
createdbyKnop’s readings:what questions and impressions are generatedbyKnop’s
account of self-determination thatmightnothavebeengeneratedbyprior accounts,
1. Bagilishema Judgement, 7 June 2001, para. 63.
∗ Ph.D. candidate and Lecturer, Department of Public International Law, Free University Amsterdam.
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such as those by renowned international legal scholars Antonio Cassese, James
Crawford, Thomas Franck, Rosalyn Higgins, and Oscar Schachter that Knop exam-
ines.1DiversityandSelf-determination in InternationalLawcouldbereadasanextension
of the rich line of international legal inquiry and authority generated by scholars
such as these, on the topic of self-determination. This essay suggests, however, that
Knop’s book be valued more for its disquieting possibilities than for its undoubted
authoritativepotential.OnemightreadKnop’sbookto learnaboutdiversityandself-
determination in international law. Yet onemight also, this essay seeks to show, read
Knop’s book to unlearn what one otherwise knows of these topics in international
law.
In reading Diversity and Self-determination in International Law for its challenges
and difference (as well as challenging the book’s and, by extension, this essay’s
fascinationwith difference), this essay invokes the words and ‘spirit’ of Beyond Good
and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future by Friedrich Nietzsche.2 It does not mine
Beyond Good and Evil for meanings or doctrines that might be ‘applied’ (in this case,
to Knop’s book).3 Rather it looks (or listens) to Beyond Good and Evil for its tempo.
‘[T]empo’, wrote Nietzsche, ‘is as signiﬁcant a power in the development of peoples
as in music.’4 Languages spoken at a steady, ponderous tempo, Nietzsche surmised,
‘miss thedaringnuancesof free, free-spirited thought’; such ‘daring’ thought tends to
proceed at an erratic, contrary, accelerated tempo.5 This essay relays ‘impression[s]’
of Knop’s book at a pace and pitch approximating that set by Nietzsche’s work.6
It asks four questions of Diversity and Self-determination in International Law – only
four, among the many that might surface from a careful reading of this book.
These questions are cast, after Beyond Good and Evil, as ‘mere attempt[s] and, if you
will, . . . temptation[s]’ towards a practice of reading.7
To read Knop’s book intercut with Beyond Good and Evil is not to pour Knop into
aNietzscheanmould, submittingDiversity and Self-determination in International Law
to the commandof anabsentphilosopher-king.Rather, theNietzscheanmasterwork
has been cut and spliced according to the distinct provocations ofDiversity and Self-
determination in International Law. The questions posed of Knop’s book in this essay
are intended less as ways of overcoming this book (self-described as a legal text) via
another book (self-described as a philosophical text) than indications, along lines
laid by Knop’s book itself, of how it might be read. Rather than ‘pressing [Knop’s
book] into formulas’ and rendering it ‘easy to look over, easy to think over, intel-
ligible and manageable’, this essay listens for notes ‘perhaps . . .more fragile, more
1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bo¨se. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft (1886), repr. as ‘Beyond Good and
Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future’, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (2000
[1967]), 179–435, at 295. ForKnop’s readings of thework of Cassese, Crawford, Franck,Higgins and Schachter
on self-determination, see Knop, at pp. 29–49 and 92–105 and sources cited therein.
2. On the ‘spirit’, see Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 258–9, 243–6, 349–52, 418.
3. Contra J. Richardson and B. Leiter (eds.),Nietzsche (2001), especially chs. 1–6.
4. F. Nietzsche,The Gay Science:With a Prelude in German Rhymes and anAppendix of Songs, ed. B.Williams, trans.
J. Nauckhoff and A. Del Caro (2001), 36.
5. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 230. For other remarks on ‘tempo’ in Beyond Good and Evil, see Nietzsche, supra
note 1, at 229–31, 306, 372–4, 386–8, 401.
6. On ‘experiments’, see ibid., at 324.
7. Ibid., at 242.
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broken, but . . . full of newdissatisfaction andundertows’.8 These notes – sometimes
harsh,sometimesindistinct–arethosethatthisessaywouldamplify inKnop’s ‘study
of the “norm” in its ﬁght against the “exception”’.9 In each case, this ampliﬁcation
causes other notes to be lost. Both the tug of ‘subtle commanding’ and the tease of
‘subtle obeying’ are at work in this essay.10
CastingDiversity and Self-determination in International Law in ameˆle´ewith Beyond
Good and Evil might, at ﬁrst blush, seem ill-ﬁtting to the book’s calm, prudent
tone. Yet for all its poise, Diversity and Self-determination in International Law enacts
a quiet disobedience. Karen Knop is respectful, even deferential in this book, but
she is not afraid of a ﬁght. Indeed, to open the ‘deep structures, biases and stakes’
of international law to contestation is precisely what Knop names, twice, as her
strategic objective (pp. 5, 373). It is, moreover, amid some ‘commonplace’ sites of
scholarlydisagreement that she setsupcamp, siteswithwhich the international law
of self-determination is riddled: ‘It is commonplace that international lawyers differ
on whether a right of self-determination of peoples in international law includes a
rightofsecession,andifso, inwhatcircumstances’ (p.1).Whereassomeinternational
legal writers regard normative divergence and uncertainty as an endpoint (a point
of breakdown, signifying the failure of the lawyers’ task) or a starting point (a
point of inspiration, indicating the amount of lawyerly work still to be done), Knop
revels in this state. She returns to it repeatedly, deﬁantly. Her targets: the ‘unhelpful’,
demobilizing ‘generality’of international lawonself-determinationandthewritings
and readings that produce it (p. 1).
As a reviewer, one could offer such unhelpful generalities about Diversity and
Self-determination in International Law. One could present, for example, a pre´cis of the
book’s three parts. Part I reviews the ‘post-Cold War international legal literature’
on self-determination. This part begins with the question of the categorization of
international norm(s) concerning self-determination (are they rules, principles, or
both?), thereby examining ‘the sort of conversation we can have in international
law about self-determination’. It continues with a review of certain gate-keeping
questions: who is a ‘people’ and when does a right of self-determination entitle a
people to choose independence? It then considers the character of ‘the interlocutors
and the claimants anticipated by rendition[s] of self-determination’ and the role
that recurring narrative scenarios play in investing particular ‘rendition[s]’ with
credibility (pp. ix–x, 41, 91).
Parts II and III then present a series of case studies of the interpretation of the
international law of self-determination ‘in practice’. These two parts grapple, re-
spectively, with the ‘challenge of culture’ and the ‘challenge of gender’. The case
8. Ibid., at 326, 424.
9. Ibid., at 337 (‘study . . . the “norm” in its ﬁght against the “exception”: there you have a spectacle that is good
enoughforgodsandgodlikemalice!Or, stillmoreclearly:vivisect the“goodman,” the“homobonaevoluntatis”–
yourselves!’).
10. Ibid., at 344. Cf. at 379 (‘the hereditary art of commanding and obeying’) and at 379 (‘nothing has been
exercised and cultivated better and longer among men so far than obedience . . .This need seeks to satisfy
itself and to ﬁll its formwith content . . . it seizes upon things as a rude appetite, rather indiscriminately, and
accepts whatever is shouted into its ears by someone who issues commands – parents, teachers, laws, class
prejudices, public opinions’).
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studies compiled under these twin rubrics concern instances where ‘groups tradi-
tionally marginalized in international law have used self-determination to oppose
dominant representations of them and their rights’. These studies do not, however,
purport to ‘step outside the parameters of interpretation to examinewhose interests
were really represented’, nor does one part stand apart from the other. Rather, they
are set against and alongside each other in ‘dialectical movement’ to comprise a
‘history of critical engagement’: a history within which the very acts of repres-
entation and interpretation involved in its telling are cast into question (pp. ix–x,
23–6).
Alternatively, in a spirit of inclusion, one could ask you, reader, to take your pick
of some possible summations. Diversity and Self-determination in International Law is
a book about (select one):
(i) injustices of exclusion and inequality in international law, or ‘ways in which
groups affected by the right of self-determination of peoples may be included
in or excluded from its interpretation’ (p. 4);
(ii) the susceptibility of international legal doctrine and international legal insti-
tutions to ‘challenges from the margins’ and the perplexing effects of those
challenges (p. 14);
(iii) choices, responsibilities and ethics of interpretation, speciﬁcally, the desir-
ability of interpretation that ‘engages on a basis of equality all those directly
affected [thereby]’ (p. 5);
(iv) ‘cultural [and] normative context[s]’ of the international law of self-
determinationandthedependenceof its texts’ coherenceandauthority thereon
(p. 180);
(v) sight, spectacle and perspective, or themany ‘lens[es]’ throughwhich the inter-
national law of self-determinationmay be viewed (p. 371);
(vi) all of the above, in varying degrees; or
(vii) none of the above.
Yet Diversity and Self-determination in International Law invites engagement be-
yondtherealmofpre´cisandmultiplechoice. It invitesquestions,protests, ‘dangerous
maybes’.11 It invites readers to regard themselves as ‘implicated’ in the ‘constitut[ion]
[of] its authority’ (pp. 30, 274).Here, then, fromone so implicated, are somequestions
posed to this authority, beginning with the question of authority itself.
2. WHERE DOES AUTHORITY LIE IN DIVERSITY AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law does not discourage a customary
bow to the author (such as that made in the title to this essay). Indeed, picking
11. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 200.
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up this hard-cover tome, published by the venerable Cambridge University Press,
one may feel impelled to pay one’s dues to the woman named on its spine. Long
after the death of the author has been proclaimed, one ﬁnds oneself gazingwistfully
into the space that the deadwould occupy, looking for proper nouns.12 The acknow-
ledgements at the front of this book only reinforce this sensation – the temptation
to ‘plop and relapse into old loves andnarrowness’.13 In the acknowledgements (and
the list of titles in the series ofwhich this book is part), the nameKarenKnop enjoys
proximity to some well-known, long-tenured names. The latter are cast, in Knop’s
acknowledgements, in sympathetic roles: as ‘support[ers]’, ‘supervis[ors]’, providers
of ‘suggestions’, ‘comments’ and even ‘a home’ (pp. xi–xii). Several esteemed insti-
tutions are likewise credited with having tendered ﬁnancial and other resources in
support of this book. Moreover, the manuscript on which this book was based has,
one discovers, earnedKarenKnop a doctorate (p. xi). Not only is KarenKnop author,
lawyer, and teacher, we learn, she is doctor too. Knowledge, with a capital K, seems
to stand protectively at the shoulder of Karen Knop.
Yet one is soon encouraged, by this book, to turn attention elsewhere, beyond the
acknowledgements and the naming of names. Knop does not wish to stand on an
authorial soapbox or in the beneﬁcent glow of her sponsors. She wishes to stand
alongside us – the readers of Diversity and Self-determination in International Law – to
constitute a ‘we’ of ‘readers and potential speakers’ (p. 30).14 Diversity and Self-
determination in International Law articulates, we are told, ‘a practice of reading’,
not a practice of writing, lawyering, instruction, or healing (p. 50). Karen Knop,
author, lawyer, teacher, doctor, is reinvented as reader, getting down and dirty with
other readers. It is, it seems, in the midst of an ever-shifting readerly ‘we’ that the
effects (or even the effectiveness) of this bookmight be gauged.
Shifting it may be, but this readerly ‘we’ is not amorphous or indistinct. Knop’s
‘practice of reading’ involves the ‘situat[ion] [of] the activity of interpretation in an
international community that historically has marginalized precisely the groups
for whom the concept of self-determination has the greatest signiﬁcance’ (p. 50).
This practice, in turn, involves the ‘constitut[ion] [of] these human communities
in distinctive ways’ (p. 51). ‘[I]nternational community’ as such is emasculated by
the possibility of its divergent construction amid variable interpretive situations,
including the situation of the ‘marginalized’. The ‘distinctive[ness]’ of the sites and
possibilitiesof interpretationexploredseemstocarrygreater import, in thisaccount,
than any integrity or continuity of their settings.
Distinctiveness and difference seem, indeed, to exert a talismanic force upon
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law. This book is concerned
with ‘draw[ing] attention to . . . difference’, with presenting a ‘differentiated’ his-
tory of women’s participation in the development of the international law of
12. See further R. Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image, Music, Text, trans. S. Heath (1977);
M. Foucault, ‘What is an Author’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. P. Rabinow (1984), 101–20.
13. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 364.
14. Knop expresses concern ‘not [with] what self-determination means, but [with] how international lawyers
say what they do about its meaning and howwe, as readers and potential speakers, are implicated in it’.
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self-determination, and with ‘Distinguishing different types of exclusion and the
relationships between them’ (pp. 91, 280, 373). One could recognize this as a
strategy of engendering ‘openness toward the particular’ within a discourse that
works, frequently, toward the universal (p. 377). Alternatively, one could read this
‘practice of reading’ as one of idealism, whereby the image of ‘difference’ – the
idiosyncratic interpretive ‘situat[ion]’ resistant to blurring or dispersal – is
venerated.
Neither writer nor reader bears commanding authority in Diversity and Self-
determination in International Law. Rather, residual hopes for some directive order
are invested in the ‘difference’ of international legal scholars, women, indigenous
peoples, and others on whom the book focuses.15 Difference is the citadel in which
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law would seek sanctuary from dif-
fusion. Might we not ask of this difference-refuge whether ‘[t]here is something
arbitrary in [this book] stopping here but laying [its] spade aside; [whether] there
is also something suspicious about it’?16 We have learnt, from Knop herself, to be
cautious of such stoppages. We have learnt that retreats of this sort tend to shel-
ter concentrations of power to which only a privileged, ‘central’ few have access.
Knop’s book generates a restlessness that works against any such taking of refuge;
the appetites to which it gives rise cannot be quelled by an appeal to difference.
3. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘DIVERSITY’
AND ‘SELF-DETERMINATION’ IN DIVERSITY AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Does this insistence on diversity in Diversity and Self-determination in Inter-
national Law ﬂow into some defence of a determined self? I would answer: not
necessarily.17 If anything, the relationship seems to run in the reverse: this book
projects the contingent, power-sodden self against a relatively stable screen of dif-
ference.18 Diversity is the condition, or pre-condition, of the ‘age’ (p. 5). It is the
‘challenge’ with which interpreters of self-determination must wrestle (p. 2). It is
the ground in which self-determination is seeded.
If the self of the interpreter is rendered ‘arguable’, why, then, does the inter-
preters’ situational diversity remain intact? Diversity and Self-determination in In-
ternational Law encourages ‘openness towards locally and regionally idiosyncratic
arrangements’ and ‘openness towards the particular’, rather than openness of,within
or beyond these supposed states of being (p. 377, emphasis added; quoting Martti
15. For Nietzsche’s derisive, catty accounts of the ‘difference’ of women, see Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 272, 277,
279, 352–60, 374–5, 407–10.
16. Ibid., at 419.
17. Cf. ibid., at 237 (‘And if somebody asked, “but to a ﬁction there surely belongs an author?” – couldn’t one
answer simply:why? Doesn’t this “belongs” perhaps belong to the ﬁction, too? Is it not permitted to be a bit
ironical about the subject no less than the predicate and object?’).
18. Knopcontends: ‘If rhetoric teachesus thatargument isboundupwiththe identityof thespeaker, that identity
itself becomes arguable . . .The way that an institutional interpreter constitutes its authority . . .helps to
determine both how it engages the contribution of insiders and outsiders and how this engagement is
received by them.’
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Koskenniemi in the former instance). The self that would be determined is made
partial, ‘complex and contingent’: theproduct of a ‘patternof creativity’ (pp. 24, 110).
Yet one is encouraged to ‘imagine and analyse . . .what judging across differ-
ence might look like’ (p. 380). Doesn’t this vision of ‘judging across difference’
(p. 380)19 also enact a judgement of difference as ‘deep’, ‘evident’ and beyond ques-
tion (p. 381)?20 Why is the ‘situation’ or ‘particular[ity]’ that ostensibly marks the
difference of a legal interpreter any ‘deep[er]’ than the self or identity that is thework
of legal interpretation? What or who is being protected by this entrenchment?
Then again, these questions may be beside the point (or at least one of them)
towards which Diversity and Self-determination in International Law is driving. The
positioning of diversity more or less where the will of the people, nature, race, or
someothersuchanchormightotherwisebeexpectedtolie intheinternational lawof
self-determinationmaybea strategicmove, for subversive effect. This couldbeaway
of devolving power amid those battles in which the book is embroiled. This could
permit back-door entry into ‘the range of legally defensible interpretations’ by those
who have historically been denied entry, ‘creat[ing] a space . . . in which indigenous
peoples [and others] could engage in their own activity of deﬁnition’ (pp. 50, 380).21
Indigenous peoples’ ‘own[ership]’ of this deﬁnitional activity and its products may
well be a ﬁction, but this is only problematic if one privileges an abstract truth
above such ‘pattern[s] of creativity’, which Knop seems disinclined to do. To ﬁnd
echoes of self-protection in Knop’s defence of diversity seems mean-spirited and
inattentive: another act of corrective assimilation along the lines of those that Knop
would resist; another ‘“quick-ﬁx frenzy of doing good with an implicit assumption
of cultural supremacy”’ (p. 24, quoting Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak).
Yet, regardless of subversive intent, the allegiances that Diversity and Self-
determination in International Law betrays do turn ‘once more in the same orbit’
of works that Knop would write against (or, at least, across which she would write
obliquely).22 Knop ‘return[s] . . . [or enacts] a homecoming to a remote, primordial,
and inclusive household of the soul . . . [such that] theway seems barred against cer-
tain other possibilities’.23 Before difference, Knop seems to halt, refusing to ‘play the
wicked game’ of challenging the challenges that self-determination would pose.24
Talk turns, instead, to the need for ‘persua[sion]’ (p. 380).25 Knop seems to give in to
the temptation to ‘say Yes, love, and adore’, in lieu of a Nietzschean ‘No’.26 Knop’s
book itself demands vigilance against such ‘homecoming[s]’, warning that theymay
serve to ‘restore the . . . fortiﬁcations’ againstwhich indigenouspeoples,womenand
19. Knop refers to judging across ‘deeply diverse andmarginalized groups’.
20. Knop states, ‘I would suggest that the context of diversity and historical inequalitywithinwhich persuasion
so evidentlymust operate in international society also exists in many domestic societies’ (emphasis added).
21. Knop describes such space-creation as one of an array of strategic responses to culture and gender difference
that are enacted in the self-determination cases that she reads.
22. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 217. For the names of authors of such works, see supra note 1 and related text.
23. Ibid., at 217.
24. Ibid., at 315.
25. ‘[I]f optimism about ﬁnding the rule is misplaced, so too is pessimism about the possibility of persuading
deeplydiverse andmarginalizedgroups that an interpretation is legitimateandshould thereforebecomplied
with.’
26. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 349. See also infra note 47 and related text.
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others have been struggling for centuries (under the auspices of self-determination
andotherwise) (p.26).27WhythendoesDiversityandSelf-determination in International
Law come home to one or other interpretive situation?
Reading diversity in Knop as a homecoming: is this vigilance or paranoia? It
may be wrong to read Knop’s insistence on diversity as a loss of nerve, a ‘spasm of
penitence’.28 Knop may, instead, be enacting a critique of transparency by refusing
to ‘measur[e] [a] reality [of self-determination] against a purely invented world of
the unconditional and self-identical’.29 Alternatively, it may be right to detect in
this gesture some ‘personal timidity and vulnerability’ and to cry, in response, ‘let
us clench our teeth! let us open our eyes and keep our hand ﬁrm on the helm!’30 Is
Knop’s book, in fact, open to diversity or self-protectively closed around diversity?
Does Knop’s diversiﬁcation of self-determination come at a price, that price being
the determination of diversity? In grappling with such questions, Nietzsche offers
no respite: ‘Supposing that this also is only interpretation – and you will be eager
enough tomake this objection? – well, so much the better.’31
4. IS DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AN ACT OF INTERPRETATION?
Following the lead suggested by this last quote from Nietzsche, one might regard
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law –whether homecoming or home-
wrecking – as ‘only interpretation’. At last, you declare, a diagnosis, and with it, the
possibility of a cure! ‘Interpretation’, Karen Knop writes,
signiﬁes the room that the interpreter’s theory of law, his model of law and legal
reasoning, makes for argument and the kinds of arguments it recognizes as valid. The
choice of an interpretive theory determines how to speak; it sets the limits and terms
of the conversation about meaning that may be had in international law. As such,
interpretation rules in or out the sorts of reasoning that resonate most strongly with
the groups affected. (p. 4, emphasis in original)
Towards the endofDiversity and Self-determination in International Law, Knop laments
‘international lawyers[’] . . .neglect of the inevitability of interpretation and the
challenges it presents’.
Diversity and Self-determination in International Lawmight, then, be read as an en-
actment of precisely the sort of ‘enterprise of interpretation’ of which Karen Knop
would apparently like to see more: a ‘ﬂuid interpretive practice’ prepared to engage
27. HereKnopiswritingagainst thetendency,of international lawyerscriticalof international law,toregard ‘each
assault on the citadel [as] the ﬁrst’, noting that this ‘restores the original fortiﬁcations because international
law, the target of criticism, is taken to remain the same’.
28. Nietzsche, supranote 1, at 349, also at 339 (‘One should not be too right if onewants to have thosewho laugh
on one’s own side’).
29. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 217, Cf. 316 (on the importance of ‘learn[ing] caution . . . and put[ting] a halt to
the exaggerated manner in which the “unselﬁng” and depersonalization of the spirit is being celebrated
nowadays as if it were a goal itself and redemption and transﬁguration’). See, e.g., Knop, p. 25 (‘On any
approach to self-determination in international law, there will be identities that remain invisible’).
30. Nietsche, supra note 1, at 203, 221.
31. Ibid., at 220–1.
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‘challenge[r]s’ (pp. 16, 380). The book takes a ‘look at the central processes and insti-
tutions of international law’ and interprets these as potential-laden ‘episodes . . . [of]
oppos[ition]’, albeit not ‘unproblematic’ ones (pp. 26, 23–4). It makes a legal in-
terpretation of legal ‘arguments . . . about self-determination . . . presented as such’
(p. 16). By the termsof its owndescription, this interpretation ‘assume[s] andcreate[s]
a world’ and defends a ‘model of law and legal reasoning’ (pp. 4–5). Moreover,
the interpretation of the ‘processes and institutions of international law’ enacted
by this book does not, Knop is at pains to point out, ‘step outside the paramet-
ers of interpretation to examine whose interests were really represented’ (p. 24).
Knop’s account operates within ‘the range of legally defensible interpretations’
(p. 50).
Yet, on rereading it, onewonders if the ‘interpretive practice’ enacted byDiversity
and Self-determination in International Law is as ‘ﬂuid’ as it would have us believe? If
it does indeed ‘create a world’ of interpretive possibility, then this world is a world
withinanotherworld, for thebook identiﬁes as its larger settinga ‘dominantdiscourse’
traceable back to the ‘past century’ (pp. 17–9). Thus the acts of interpretation of
which the book gives an account seem already to have occurred, in signiﬁcant
part, prior to its writing. The ‘creat[ion]’ of an enfolding ‘world’ of ‘dominan[ce]’
seems to pre-date, and thereby escape, to some degree, the book’s inquiry. The
genesis and bequest of this ‘world’ form part of the background toDiversity and Self-
determination in International Law: they comprise the book’s unremembered history;
its unknowable origins; that which it asks us to take as given.
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law purports to be a ‘micro-
history of [interpretive] attempts’, an ‘examin[ation] [of] the interpretation of self-
determination’, a contribution towards ‘thinking about legal interpretation’ (pp. 25,
380–1). As such, it claims for itself the status of an interpretation of interpretation,
and thereby steps away from its own interpretive practice and the ‘world’ assumed
thereby. It looks backwards and forwards from an interpretive ‘situation’ that it de-
clines, in signiﬁcant part, to interrogate. Instead, it seeks to ‘recuperate one history
of critical engagement’ and foretell ‘the shape of future possibilities’ (pp. 26, 16). The
‘situation’ of shewhomobilizes a theory of lawas situational interpretation remains
relatively intact throughout its deployment. To VirginiaWoolf’s geographic ‘pledge
of indifference’ (‘As a woman, I have no country . . .As a woman my country is the
whole world’), Karen Knop would, it seems, add a further pledge: a pledge of alle-
giance to a pre-interpretive ethical stance resistant to dominance. This is a stance
which the interpreters she examines are not permitted to adopt (p. 280, quoting
Virginia Woolf). Their role is rather to produce interpretations to be interpreted
by she who has cast them in the role of interpretation-producers. Among the unre-
solved tensions at work inDiversity and Self-determination in International Law is this
uneasy dalliance between action and commentary, involvement and detachment,
engagement and indifference; between being at once work of international law
and a work on international law.
To ﬁnd hiding-places and anchorages within Diversity and Self-determination in
International Law is not, however, to declare it awork of avoidance. The bookpersists
in its call for engagementwith the struggles intowhich it launches its readers. It does
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not make accessible a ‘reconstructive dimension’ beyond the tortured history that
it documents (p. 14). The possibility for ‘deeper change’ that it ‘explore[s]’ remains
‘structured . . . like the critiques that provoked it’ (p. 14). Its ‘interpretations’ are not
cleansing or corrective. Rather, they imply that ‘The consequences of our actions
takeholdofus, quite indifferent toour claimthatmeanwhilewehave “improved”’.32
Yet, at the same time, its interpretations are ‘recuperat[ive]’ (p. 26).33 ‘At their best’,
Knop writes, ‘the shifts [that Knop traces in Parts II and III of the book] may all be
seen as directed toward an ideal of legal interpretation for a world that is simul-
taneously integrating and diversifying’ (p. 15). These shifts – and Knop’s reading
of them – may, however, be seen in much the same terms at their worst: as moves
towards deceptive idealism; vain hopes for impunity or redemption; the regress-
ive channelling of resources and authority towards pre-selected interpreter-elites.34
Precisely here, in this unavoidable slippage between thatwhich onewould call free-
right-pure-original-legitimate and thatwhichonewould call unfree-wrong-corrupt-
derivative-illegitimate, lies a further ‘challenge’ that Diversity and Self-determination
in International Lawwould have us confront.
This may be the most dangerous maybe of Diversity and Self-determination in
International Law :
Itmight . . . bepossible thatwhat constitutes thevalueof these goodand revered things
is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked,
seemingly opposite things . . .Maybe!35
What good, you may ask, is all this to the indigenous peoples, women and others
about whom the international law of self-determination (and Knop’s book, no less)
hasbeenwritten? Perhapsthechallengeposedfor international lawbytheparticular
constituencies about whom Knop writes is for it to be by, for, or against them
in speciﬁc instances, rather than setting out to be, in some general, consistent,
unimpeachable way, good for them or good to them.
5. WHY ‘INCLUSION’?
As noted above, Diversity and Self-determination in International Law at times encour-
ages ‘striving toward an ideal’ whereby ‘inclusion and equality [are recognized] as
essential to interpretation’ (p. 5). It traces ‘a pattern of practices aimed at reducing
inequities of contribution as well as depiction’ (p. 211). These practices, it suggests,
‘seem like promising ground for normative consideration’ (p. 374). Working this
ground, it suggests, one might learn to look at self-determination ‘through the lens
of the minority self’ rather than ‘through the lens of equality’ (p. 371).
Why do so? What drives this impulse in Diversity and Self-determination in Inter-
national Law? If one takes seriously Knop’s argument that it is imperative for legal
32. Ibid., at 283.
33. Where she states that ‘The book seeks . . . to recuperate . . . potential.’
34. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 276 (‘The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen
our evil as what is best in us’).
35. Ibid., at 200.
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prescriptions ‘to be located in a discourse – to be supplied with history and destiny,
beginning and end, explanation and purpose’ – in order for them to sustain some
sense of legitimacy and force, then one might ask from what ‘destiny’ this book
derives its claim to ‘promising ground’ (p. 68, quoting Robert Cover).
On one occasion Knop observes that the practice of adopting ‘minority’ lenses,
or switching spectacles from time to time, ‘may prove useful in thinking about
legal interpretation in transitional, multinational and plural societies’ (p. 381). Is
usefulness the motivation here? If so, for what and to whom is the law of self-
determination to be ‘prove[n] useful’ by this book? Knop implies, in the statements
quotedabove, that it is tobemadeuseful for ‘thinking’and ‘normativeconsideration’.
Elsewhere, however, Knop suggests that the book’s rhetorical engagements might
have ‘signiﬁcant practical effect’ for the litigation of indigenous land claims (p. 375).
Is its ‘practical effect’ in such settings to be the measure of this book’s usefulness?
Knop’s scale of ‘useful[ness]’ is deﬁantly imprecise.
In another instance, Knop casts her reading of the decision of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee in Sandra Lovelace v. Canada as an operation of protest
(pp. 359–72). In lieu of an opposition between feminism and self-determination,
this reading enacts ‘opposition to the changes that colonialism has wrought in
indigenous societies’ (p. 359). Are political allegiance and solidarity the stimuli
here? If so, to what is this allegiance borne and with whom is this solidarity felt?
Knop works to insinuate into the ‘canon’ and ‘culture’ of the international law
of self-determination ‘Islamic communities, colonies, ethnic nations, indigenous
peoples, women and others’ (pp. 277, 373). Her readings seem dedicated to these
‘others’, and to enabling them to ‘emerge as integral to the interpretation of self-
determination historically’ (p. 373). If so, how is the book’s audience asked to relate
to these ‘others’? Does the book incite strength and solidarity among a relatively
disempowered readership, or goodwill and self-congratulation among a relatively
powerful readership? Does the ‘end’ ofDiversity and Self-determination in International
Law reside in the promise of expression, inclusion, and empowerment for ‘others’?
Or does it reside in the virtue – the warmth-and-fuzziness – of our permitting,
encouraging, and enabling ‘others’?36 Does it matter?
To these questions, and the question ‘why inclusion?’, Diversity and Self-
determination in International Law affords no deﬁnite answers. It enunciates no singu-
lar ‘purpose’. Its refusal to yield in this regard seems to engender the sense of quiet
daringwithwhich it is infused: the exuberantNietzschean ‘No’ that lurks among its
‘Yeses’.37 This book is interested and driven in the ambivalent ways suggested in the
preceding paragraphs, and more. However, it offers no explanation or justiﬁcation
for the extensive research and writing that has yielded these 434 plus pages. This
book simply does not generate the need – or tolerate, in its readers, the demand – for
a reason or a rationale. It asks more of us than that. It asks more than many other
36. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 235 (‘There is too much charm and sugar in these feelings of “for others”, “not for
myself”, for us not to need to become doubly suspicious at this point and to ask: “are these not perhaps –
seductions?”’).
37. See supra note 25 and related text, and infra note 46 and related text.
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international lawwriters have been inclined to ask.38 There is no ‘ahah!’ moment in
reading Diversity and Self-determination in International Lawwhere one has the sense
that one knows, now, ormight at some time know,what those international lawyers
are, or were, really up to. Knop offers no assurance along the lines of ‘read/believe/
act upon this book and the world/you/others will be better off’.
Even so, there is some sense of goodliness hovering about this book.When Knop
writes about lawyers ‘do[ing] justice to identity’, her tone is more that of a peace-
maker than a rabble-rouser (p. 360). There is little sense of enmity,mischief, or gaiety
in Diversity and Self-determination in International Law. Among its narrative voices a
kind, compassionate, rather earnest voice rings out loudest. In striking this note,
Knopmay have gauged her audience well, recalling, as Nietzsche did, Stendhal:
Pour eˆtre bon philosophe, il faut eˆtre sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier, qui a fait
fortune, a une partie du caracte`re requis pour faire des de´couvertes en philosophe,
c’est-a`-dire pour voir clair dans ce qui est.39
Thinking again, could it be that this note in Knop’s book renders it too harmoni-
ous? Itmightmake sense toplay clearly and fairlywhen it ‘goes against . . . taste’, but
isn’t Knop’s book just a little too tasteful, a little too appropriate for contemporary
bankers of a certain persuasion wishing to see clearly into what ‘is’?40 Might the
other notes inDiversity and Self-determination in International Law be drowned out by
thisparticular chordofgoodconcord? Or is it that theantagonistic, themischievous,
and the gay are no longer discordant or ‘against . . . taste’? Dissonance is, after all, so
terriblymodernist. Those ‘written and painted thoughts’ that ‘not long ago . . .were
still so colorful, youngandmalicious, full of thorns and secret spices . . .havealready
taken off [their] novelty, and some . . . are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already
look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull!’41 I ask: why inclusion? Youmight
well ask, in return, for that matter, why Nietzsche? Might it not be time for some
subversive earnestness? Could it be, youmight ask, that it is precisely this combin-
ation that is, right now, ‘different’ about Knop’s book? Isn’t that, after all, what this
essay was intent on recording?
6. CONCLUSION
The conclusion to Diversity and Self-determination in International Law begins with a
history of debate and a matter for choice (‘For over a century, international lawyers
have debated the right of a group to choose its sovereignty’ (p. 373)). It ends with a
‘maybe’, a return to the beginning, and a glance towards the ‘beyond’ (‘the sense of
possibilities that this book has sought to communicatemay be relevant beyond the
question of secession fromwhich it began’) (p. 381).
38. See supra note 1 and related text for examples of such other authors.
39. ‘To be a good philosopher, onemust be dry, clear, without illusion. A bankerwho hasmade a fortune has one
character trait that is needed formaking discoveries in philosophy, that is to say, for seeing clearly intowhat
is’, quoted in Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 240 (translation is Kaufmann’s from note 20 thereof).
40. Ibid. (‘Aﬁnal trait for the imageof the free-spiritedphilosopher is contributedbyStendhalwhom, considering
German taste, I do not want to fail to stress – for he goes against the German taste’).
41. Ibid., at 426.
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Diversity and Self-determination in International Law seems to aspire ‘to become
masterover themanyvainandoverly enthusiastic interpretations andconnotations
that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo
natura’.42 Its ﬁrst line anticipates historical summation, a decisive end to protracted
international legal debates over self-determination. Its last line, however, makes ‘a
suddenly erupting decision in favor of ignorance . . . a refusal to let things approach,
a kind of state of defense against much that is knowable, a satisfaction with the
dark, with the limiting horizon’.43 It says: ‘we who have put the same question to
ourselves a hundred times, we have found and ﬁnd no better answer’.44 With that,
Diversity and Self-determination in International Law simply shuts down, turns off the
lights, goes home, leaving its readers to trawl through the bibliography, if they will,
for clues of what was just concluded.
This bookdoes, nevertheless, offer some ‘patterns’ and ‘promise’ in its conclusion.
Knop recalls an ‘array of responses’, that may be taken from the case studies, to
the problem of reconstituting legal authority under conditions of inequality and
partiality (p. 374). Formalequality is ‘themosteasily identiﬁable’ of these, she reports
(p. 377). Another ‘response’ is to ‘maximize the liberal and democratic tendencies of
international law’ (p. 378). A third approach addresses bias through the functional
calibrationof sociological equivalence across different cultures (pp. 378–9).A fourth
is associated with ‘rebuilding’ and ‘restructuring’ international lawwith the goal of
‘equalizing cultural perspectives’ (p. 379).
The ‘promise’ of these divergent responses is said to rest with their potential for
making ‘more-or-less visible’ an ‘ideal of judgment’, ‘seeing concretely’, ‘imagin[ing]
and analyz[ing]’, ‘turning [a conventional legal] comparison on its head’ (pp. 380–1).
In this ‘promise’, we catch again ‘glimmers of striving toward an ideal of
interpretation’, notwithstanding the fact that Knop has told us that ‘the inten-
tion of this book is a different one’ (p. 5). Here we see, perhaps, ‘that by no means
unproblematic readiness of the spirit to deceive other spirits and to dissimulate in
front of them, that continual urge and surge of a creative, form-giving, changeable
force . . . [that] enjoys the multiplicity and craftiness of its masks’.45
IsDiversity and Self-determination in International Law a sketch of an ‘ideal of inter-
pretation’ or a crafty account of the dangers and seductions of such ideals? Where
do the ‘patterns’ end and where does the ‘promise’ begin? Do these unanswered
questions and unresolved dilemmas amount to the ‘experience of international law’
that Knop would have us relish (p. 381)? If so, where might this experience ﬁt in
our old ﬁles?46 Here is a possible answer: nowhere, comfortably.
This ‘nowhere, comfortably’ – neither diversity nor self-determination – is, per-
haps, as much as one could cobble together by way of a bottom line toDiversity and
42. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 351.
43. Ibid., at 350.
44. Ibid., at 352.
45. Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 350.
46. Ibid. (‘[The] intent [of “[t]hat commanding something which the people call ‘the spirit”’] in all this is to
incorporate new “experiences”, to ﬁle new things in old ﬁles – growth, in a word – or, more precisely, the
feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power’).
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Self-determination in International Law. And if you are such a cobbler, my reader, then
by all means bemy guest: pull out your shoehorn, your hammer and your last; read
this book; and see if you can fashion it into amore comfortable pump. Or else, ‘force
[your] spirit to recognize things against the inclination of the spirit, and . . . also
against the wishes of [your] heart – by way of saying No where [you] would like to
say Yes, love, and adore’; going barefoot where you would like to go shod; reading
for impressions and uncertainties where you would like to know thoroughly; seek-
ing more than what I have offered in this essay, or what Knop and Nietzsche have
offered elsewhere: more than the ‘different’ and the ‘new’; more than ‘diversity’ and
‘self-determination’.47 This is the call of Knop’s book, and of this essay: don’t stop
here.
Fleur Johns∗
47. Ibid., at 349; supra note 1 and related text.
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